UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINE RALEIGH DIVISION

25 JUL 2000

IN RE:

INTERNATIONAL HERITAGE, INC. PEGGY B. DEANS, CLERK ILS. BANKRUPTCY COURT INTERNATIONAL HERITAGE, INCORPORATES TERN DISTRICT OF N.C.

CASE NO. 99-02675-5-ATS 99-02674-5-ATS

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT

MAY 31, 2000

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE A. THOMAS SMALL UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

APPEARANCES

Trustee: Holmes P. Harden

Attorney for Larry Smith, Stanley Van Etten, and

Wood & Francis: Brent Wood

Attorneys for Stanley Van Etten: Wade Smith, Melissa Hill

Attorneys for Georgina Mollick: Joseph B. Cheshire, V

Attorney for Claude Savage: John P. O'Hale

Attorney for John David Brothers and Dee Anne Brothers:

Stephen T. Smith

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.

(CALL TO ORDER)

THE COURT: Mr. Harden?

MR. HARDEN: Thank you, Your Honor. I've given you all of my cases. I need one back. I want to give one to the judge. Judge, I'm handing up the Weintraub case. It's a Supreme Court case you may already be aware of. It's my opinion—of course, this is my motion to waive the attorney/client and work product privileges in favor of the U.S. Attorney—it's my opinion pursuant to the Weintraub case that there's no question that the estate, the trustee, has the authority to waive the attorney/client privilege.

As far as the work product privilege is concerned, I think that's probably a dual privilege that's shared by the client and his attorney, and what I want the Court to do today, Judge, is to allow me to waive that to the extent I possibly can. I don't think that I can possibly waive say Mr. Wood's objections to producing his internal memoranda or legal opinions or ideas that he would call his own work product; but to the extent that the estate or the debtor prior to the bankruptcy produced any trial preparation sorts of documents, I think it would be my privilege to waive the right to receive access to those, and I would like the Court to do that.

I did not know whether this proposal needed to be noticed out under 9019, so I thought it was the better part

of valor to go ahead and do that, particularly assuming there will be shareholders in this corporation who would not want the attorney/client privilege waived—shareholders, officers, and directors.

And my duty is to the estate obviously. I have a dual obligation to the shareholders and to the creditors, and what I'd like the Court to find today is that the creditors in this case should have the higher consideration and priority in that obligation because this, pursuant to the Weintraub case in particular, is I think the best thing for the creditors.

It's my obligation obviously to make the estate grow, and my reasoning is that the U.S. Attorney is going to provide two things. He will agree not to pursue any forfeitures, fines, or penalties, and he will agree that any restitution that may be paid if there are prosecutions and convictions, that any restitution that may be paid, that he would do his best to see that that money came back to the estate to be paid to creditors similar to the arrangement that we made with the SEC with the bond money there, and frankly, I learned recently that there is a great deal of information I haven't even seen, some 3½ inch thick stack of privileged documents—lists, single space—of privileged documents. That may be wrong—Mr. Wood can correct me—but there may be thousands of documents that I have not seen as

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trustee, and I think it would be—it's my obligation to see what's in those documents. There may be information in those documents that would lead me to causes of action against other insiders that I don't know about right now, and this would add another level of scrutiny to the case that hasn't been available to me at this point.

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If we don't do this deal, I think the U.S. Attorney is going to do one of two things, or both. He's going to go over to the District Court and argue the crime fraud exception to the waiver of the attorney/client privilege, or to the attorney/client privilege in lieu of the waiver, and I'm going to get dragged into that at the estate's expense. There will not be a deal pursuant to that. You know, if it succeeds with the District Court, the estate will not benefit whatsoever, and you might as well argue that we already waived the privilege when we did the settlement with the SEC. As you recall, one of the terms that they insisted upon was that the trustee waive the attorney/client privilege, and in this circuit, a waiver for one purpose is a waiver for everything else. So, you know, if that waiver for that litigation was a valid waiver-it may or may not have been, Your Honor-I don't know whether the SEC got hold of any confidential information, but we did agree to provide that to them. It occurred at the end of that case. And I can't tell you whether in the litigation that sort of petered out at the

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end, any confidential attorney/client information was conveyed to the SEC, but we did agree to do that. Again, if that argument prevails, there won't be any benefit to the estate whatsoever. I want to put the creditors in a position to benefit. I don't know whether they would benefit monetarily from restitution or not. There may not be any prosecutions. There may not be any convictions. But I don't see any downside, no compelling reason, for me not to waive the privilege as has been proposed. The only negative that I can think of is that we still have litigation ongoing with TIG Insurance Company, but I've spoken to-and that could obviously create a waiver in that case as well-I've spoken to Mr. Roberts. I believe Mr. Roberts is handling that matter for the estate, and we have decided that whatever marginal advantage that might give to TIG is not worth passing on this proposal from the U.S. Attorney. There may be some marginal benefit, but we just don't think it's something that ought to derail the proposal that's on the table. And that's all I have to say at this point, Your I'd like to respond to the other attorneys. Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Wood? MR. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. As the clerk

indicated, I'm here in three capacities, obviously on behalf

of Mr. Van Etten, whom I have represented throughout this matter; I'm here on a limited appearance on behalf of Mr. Smith, who I had represented in some other bankruptcy proceedings and he asked me to object on his behalf as to this issue as an officer and director; and I'm here on behalf of my firm.

And as Mr. Harden has correctly pointed out, there are some related privileges that my firm has, and also, quite frankly, Your Honor, my firm has duties to a lot of people as a result of our representation, and frankly, I did not want to run afoul of any state bar ethical issues by not letting the Court know that by waiving the privilege, it creates—places my firm and a lot of other law firms in the cross—hairs of not necessarily liability but disputes between obligations to different parties, and I think that will become clear to the Court.

With me today are Wade Smith and Melissa Hill of the firm Barrington Smith, and they represent Mr. Van Etten only. I probably misled the clerk a little bit on that, but I wanted to make sure I clarified that. And Mr. Smith will be making arguments, with the Court's permission, as well on behalf of Mr. Van Etten after I conclude my comments.

We do, Your Honor—or we are here to vehemently oppose the trustee's attempt to waive the privilege. We believe it's unnecessary. This is a constitutionally

protected right which we do not believe, under the circumstances that the trustee has presented, should be waived. I have handed to the clerk copies of a brief that my firm has prepared in support of our position, and I will reiterate some of the points that I've made in my brief and ask the Court to consider both my oral and my written arguments in this regard.

First, Your Honor, the trustee has failed to point out to the Court—may not have been aware, and I do want to give him the benefit of the doubt—the fact that this corporation in its bylaws had an indemnification provision. The key provision is set forth within my brief, and it clearly indemnifies the officers and directors in this situation. While maybe not an indemnification from criminal fines as a result of statutory authority that might prevent that, in fact, Your Honor, it would provide them legal fees in this situation.

Thus, what the trustee is ignoring is the fact that these individuals, not just Mr. Van Etten, may have a claim that would arise as a result of the trustee waiving the privilege here. They probably have a claim as of right now. Similarly, Your Honor, Mr. Van Etten entered into an employment agreement that had a similar indemnification provision. Again, it is set forth in my brief, so I will not reiterate that.

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Factually, Your Honor, I believe it's extremely important for me to reiterate what the Court may already International Heritage was a multi-level marketing company. Multi-level marketing companies survive in a complex legal environment. They are scrutinized by a variety of different state and federal regulatory agencies. Court is well aware of the actions by the Montana State Auditor's Office on securities issues, the Securities and Exchange Commission on complicated securities issues under our federal securities laws. The Court may even be familiar with the North Carolina Attorney General's Office, claims that were made-that has come up, I believe, in proceedings here before. In that action that was not under a securities statute; that was under North Carolina's pyramid statute. In different states there's lottery statutes, there's pyramid statutes, there's securities statutes.

The Federal Drug Administration will regulate a lot of multi-level marketing companies that are selling nutritional products; the Federal Trade Commission regulates unfair and deceptive trade practices federally; and then in most states you have unfair and deceptive trade practice statutes that are similar but not always identical.

The pyramid statutes are not the same in different states. They vary greatly as far as what needs to be done in order for a company to be compliant with those laws, and many

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multi-level marketing companies can make matters more legally complex for them to operate nationwide. They are not just operating in a single environment.

My point here, Your Honor, is that multi-level marketing companies necessarily, because of the complexities of what they're doing, if they wish to comply with the law, need legal assistance. International Heritage from the very beginning sought and obtained legal assistance. Locally, Your Honor, they sought legal assistance from Georgina Mollick with Ragsdale Liggett & Foley at that time; Dan Bell with Wyrick Robbin Yates & Ponton (phonetic), and then they also retained the services of a lawyer who is an expert in multi-level marketing, a gentlemen by the name of Jeff Badner out of Oregon.

Later in the history of International Heritage, after the Attorney General's Office made claims or allegations against the company in or around March or April of 1997, additional attorneys became involved with the company. At that time, I became more involved, my firm, Wood & Francis, with the company in trying to assist them in the regulatory environment with which they were involved. In addition, they retained the services of Smith Anderson Blunt Dorsett Mitchell here locally to also assist them.

Now, at that time, Your Honor, the Attorney

General's claims were not only made against the company but

they were made against Mr. Van Etten; they were made against Mr. Savage and Mr. Smith. Myself, along with Smith Anderson Blunt Dorsett & Mitchell, as well as the other lawyers, were at that time providing legal advance, not only to the company but also to other individuals, including Mr. Van Etten, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Savage. Everyone consented to that, in part because of the indemnification provisions in the bylaws and the indemnification provision in the employment agreement.

After the Attorney General's Office initiated its allegations against the company and that matter became resolved, or about the time it became resolved, the Securities and Exchange Commission, as the Court may be aware, initiated an investigation. That investigation started around the middle of 1997, and they were not just, as the facts beared out to be, investigating International Heritage; they were in fact investigating activities of individuals, including Mr. Van Etten, Mr. Savage, and Mr. Smith, and then by March of 1998, the SEC initiated their litigation.

Now, when the SEC litigation was initiated, the company and the individuals determined that it was necessary to retain additional counsel, experts in securities law, and they did retain the firm of Hutech Rock (phonetic) out of Atlanta, Georgia. Ultimately, when the SEC initiated its litigation, Hutech Rock and myself entered appearances in

Atlanta on behalf of not only both of the corporate entities—
if the Court will recall, it was at this same time, March of
1998, that International Heritage merged with Kara, Inc., and
became International Heritage, Incorporated—but there were
appearances made in those proceedings in Atlanta by myself
and by Hutech Rock on behalf of the individuals and the
corporate entities. Thus, they were being represented—were
not only representing the corporation; they were representing
individuals.

Thereafter, again as the Court is well aware, a number of civil actions were initiated. There were civil actions: two in Texas, two in Alabama, two in North Carolina, and an administrative proceeding in Montana. Additional lawyers had to be retained, if for no other purpose but to try to coordinate these actions. They were of great magnitude, purported to be class actions, and the company and the individuals retained the services of joint counsel, counsel out of Washington D. C., Deckard Price and Rhodes; out of Alabama, Serodi and Permett; out of Texas, Guardier and Wynne (phonetic spellings).

My point being, Your Honor, is that this is—and I'll get to this more—this is very different than Weintraub, where you have a true intermingling, because of the complexities of what a multi-level marketing company does. You have lawyers representing not only the company, the corporate debtor

entity, but also the individuals, and it was reasonable to do it at that time, Your Honor. The companies are trying to operate in a way that would maximize money for their shareholders, which is their duty.

I would agree with Mr. Harden that the Weintraub case is a case that we must look at, and we have addressed that case, Your Honor, in our brief, and I will address it again. We would contend that Weintraub is distinguishable. Weintraub deals with an administrative issue. It's not a criminal issue. We're not dealing with a criminal investigation in Weintraub like we're dealing with here. This is much more complex. In Weintraub, the attorney, Mr. Weintraub, was asked to answer 23 questions, if I recall correctly, in a deposition, and that is what became the subject of the case itself that went to the Supreme Court.

As Mr. Harden correctly pointed out, it does not deal with the work product privilege. It deals solely with the attorney/client privilege. And I would point the Court's attention very much so to what I believe is a final footnote in Weintraub, which we address in our brief, and in that footnote the Court points out the fact that they are not dealing with the fiduciary duty that the trustee may have to shareholders and to others.

Now, in this situation, Your Honor, the company entered into an agreement with the bylaws and with the

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employment agreement and said, "We will work together. We will indemnify you in this situation. For everything that you do when you're acting in your corporate capacities, we will protect you." And now Mr. Harden is willing to just drop that under the rug and forget about it, and we would claim—we would argue, Your Honor, that that's not appropriate. That is breaching a contract, a fiduciary duty, we would argue, to these individuals and thus should not be under these circumstances waived or forgotten.

We would also argue, Your Honor-and Mr. Smith is going to address this much more than I will-that it's not in the best interest of the debtor's estate for this Court to approve this agreement. Mr. Harden has come to you today. Ι understand his position about whether or not he needed to come or not, but he has come here, and he's said, "I want you to approve this settlement agreement," and he's presented this settlement agreement. And I would encourage, I would beg the Court, to look at that agreement because as Mr. Smith will point out to you and as we've argued in our brief, Your Honor, that agreement, with all due respect, doesn't hold water. The U.S. Attorney's office is not offering anything of substance to the debtor's estates. If Mr. Harden wants to come in here and tell you, "I want you to approve this settlement agreement," I would argue that the Court needs to look at what that agreement is. There's not a written

agreement attached. It's a representation by the trustee, and certainly Mr. Harden is of good character and he wouldn't present anything that's incorrect, but there's not anything in writing. The settlement agreements, while I have limited agreement in here, all of the ones that I've seen, even the Montana one that the trustee has just presented to the Court for approval by motion, there is a written agreement. There is a clear agreement about what the Court will be approving. That is not the case here.

I will point out again that the work product privilege is not addressed in Weintraub, and that makes it very distinguishable, and as a result, the Court will have to look at the work product privilege outside of the Weintraub decision, we would contend.

Furthermore, Your Honor, and because of the complexities of this, as I've already stated factually, the waiver of the privilege would compromise the individual privileges that a number of people, not just Mr. Smith and Mr. Savage and Mr. Van Etten, whose names I've mentioned specifically have, but other officers and directors who had legitimate reason to ask about liabilities that they may have in the situations with which this company was faced. And that is, we would contend, extremely distinguishable. It drags in additional—it's distinguishable from Weintraub—and it drags in complex constitutional issues, the ability to

protect the right for someone to speak frankly with their lawyer.

Under the cases, Your Honor—and actually I will point out to Your Honor—we have looked at the Weintraub case and all of its progeny that we can locate, and we cannot find a case that really fits into this situation where you're dealing with a complex criminal investigation. So again, that would be another distinguishing factor.

As Mr. Harden pointed out, there is a possibility that the U.S. Attorney's office may be presenting these same issues to the District Court. We would contend that that is where this is best presented. If the U.S. Attorney is going to continue to investigate and potentially prosecute or attempt to prosecute individuals and/or the corporations, then these issues, very important constitutional issues, should be before the District Court rather than trying to force this Court to conduct potentially an *in camera* review of the multitude of documents that are involved.

I will now address the issue about the number of documents involved. Mr. Van Etten, directly or indirectly pursuant to subpoenas delivered to him or to others, has produced approximately 175,000 pages of documents that were in, with all due frankness, essentially in my possession. They're in my possession largely because I was the attorney working on these matters, and the other documents that he had

relating to International Heritage were turned over to the U.S. trustee after the petitions were filed. Those 175,000 pages, or whatever the number is, we would contend are not privileged documents. There are another 30,000 that are either attorney/client privilege or work product privilege.

Mr. Harden may not recall, but I have told Mr. Harden since the beginning of this case that I had documents in my possession that might in part arguably belong to International Heritage and I would be glad to do whatever he wanted, and I always understood that he wanted me to keep those. I believe Ms. Gardner would back me up on those representations to Mr. Harden, and it may be that she is the one who told him that rather than me, but I feel extremely confident saying it was presented—was told—to Mr. Harden.

It is from the privileged documents that we produced pursuant to the subpoenas a list describing—and it is a long list that describes these documents—in accordance with the request of the U.S. Attorney's Office. Again, the purpose of not producing these documents is not because anybody believes they're liable or they're going to lead to some smoking gun, but the privilege is important to everyone, and that's why we're here today, that Mr. Harden correctly realized that it's important to a lot of different people, and he put it before the Court.

So, Your Honor, for the reasons that I've stated and

for the reasons that the other fine lawyers who are here today will tell you, we believe it's inappropriate for the Court to approve this request by the trustee. It's distinguishable from Weintraub, it is a unique situation, and the Court should deny the request, or, at the very least, defer some ruling until something occurs over in Federal District Court. We believe without a written agreement submitted to the Court, that it would be inappropriate for this Court to approve it, so there is a basis without ever addressing the attorney/client privilege of the Weintraub case to deny this motion.

So, based upon those points, Your Honor, I would respectfully request that you deny the request of the trustee. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: Thank you very much. Your Honor, we appreciate very much the opportunity to be heard on this very, very important matter, and I will not unduly trespass upon the Court's time. I would like to make two points, and Melissa Hill and I, as you now know, are appearing on behalf of Mr. Van Etten, Mr. Steve Smith, Mr. Jack O'Hale, and Mr. Joseph Cheshire, here representing other people, but there's an agreement that I will make these remarks on behalf of all of us, so I make these brief remarks, Your Honor, for everyone.

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Your Honor, we are, as you know, dealing with a very, very important constitutional right, and a very important piece of the liberty package, not to be dramatic about it, but we believe that this is a very crucial piece of the package of liberties that we have as Americans; and, of course, as Your Honor knows, the Supreme Court has dealt with this matter fairly frequently, and the most recent, as I recall, is in 1998 in the case in which Vincent Foster, just shortly before he died, spoke with his lawyer. His lawyer took notes. The office of the special prosecutor, special counsel, initiated a proceeding to get those notes on the ground that the attorney/client privilege should not survive death, the issue being that if the client dies, the privilege ought to die. And Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority in the United States Supreme Court, held that indeed the attorney/client privilege is one of the most important freedoms we cherish, and that it does in fact survive the death of the client. So the attorney/client privilege was once again reaffirmed in that important decision.

We have read Weintraub. We respect the decision in Weintraub, and we respect the position of Mr. Harden. We know he is excellent counsel and doing what he believes is right, but we do not believe, Your Honor, that you should permit this waiver. We think that this case does significantly differ from Weintraub.

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We don't know-I don't know-how many pages, documents that Mr. Harden's talking about. I'm told that it could be many thousands, maybe 30,000 pages. I don't know. know whether anyone has reviewed those pages carefully. That's not before Your Honor. It's not on the record. know that in those 30,000 or so pages there may be letters written by lawyers to individuals, not just to a corporation but to individuals. Those letters may have been written involving very important and crucial issues. They were written by lawyers who believed when they wrote them that they would never be public documents. They would include the mental impressions of lawyers perhaps. We don't know. we would assume that there must be letters in there. may be copies of letters from individuals back to their lawyers, but those individuals would never dream that those would be public. We would have to assume that there may be in that 30,000 or so documents drafts of pleadings, of memoranda, mental impressions, opinions as to law, letters containing legal advice. So we know that there may be within those pages two kinds of privileges, attorney/client privileges and work product privileges.

And if we had all those documents in front of us and could look at them and we made a pie chart, we would say, well, there must be a slice of that pie that would be attorney work product; there would be a slice of that pie in

which there would be individual attorney/client privilege documents; there would be documents that attorneys could assert a privilege because those would be work product; and there may be corporate attorney/client privilege documents.

So what we could say, Your Honor, without embellishing this and without trying to use flowery language, is that this is literally a hotbed of privilege issues, and in that way differs significantly from Weintraub, a hotbed, a veritable hotbed, a prickly bed of privilege issues involving very important constitutional rights.

And Your Honor, we know that there's an excellent United States Attorney assigned to this case, very, very able. We know that he is working this case hard. There is a federal grand jury convening. This United States Attorney is absolutely capable of dealing with all these privilege issues before sitting United States District Court Judges, who are overseeing federal grand juries, who customarily every day deal with criminal matters and who are there waiting to sort out the prickly issues if they need to be sorted out. And so, Your Honor, we respectfully ask, for those reasons, that the Court not allow the waiver in this case.

So, our point number one is this. This case is entirely different. This case involves very, very significant and extraordinarily prickly issues that would require separating documents out, looking at documents to see

which is which and what is what.

I'll make one additional point, Your Honor, and it's brief, and then I'll sit down.

With all due respect to the United States Attorney, who is, we submit, offering Mr. Harden everything that he can, everything that he has the power to offer—he doesn't have the power to offer any other things. The truth of the matter is that what he's offering cannot under the law be very much at all.

Looking at Mr. Harden's Motion for Proof of Compromise and Settlement, he says first that the Assistant United States Attorney will agree not to recommend or seek the imposition of any criminal penalties. Well, Your Honor, criminal penalties arise out of Rico actions, they are mandatory with the United States District Court Judge, and we would submit that, again with all due respect to the United States Attorney, these decisions would be made by the District Court Judge who would be sitting in this case, standing before him being the convicted defendants, and what he would do is by statute mandatory, and there's nothing, we submit, that the United States Attorney can do for Mr. Harden there.

The next thing the Motion for Approval of Compromise and Settlement says is that the Assistant United States
Attorney will agree not to recommend or seek the imposition

of fines. Well, in this instance there is some discretion on the part of the United States District Court Judge, but the judge would make the decision about fines based on very strict rules set forth by statute relating to the ability of the convicted defendant to pay and so on. And we submit that the U.S. District Court Judge would make decisions on those fines based on the guidelines set forth in the statute.

Thirdly, the Assistant United States Attorney promises not to recommend or seek imposition of any forfeitures. But Your Honor, forfeitures again are strictly limited by the statutes and are mandatory, and we submit there's nothing the Assistant United States Attorney can do to help Mr. Harden in the situation with forfeitures.

Now, further, the United States Attorney says that he or she would use best efforts to ensure that any restitution imposed in any criminal proceedings against any individuals or entities or affiliated or otherwise associated with one or both debtors would be distributed to the creditors.

If Your Honor pleases, we submit that in looking at restitution, United States District Court Judges provide restitution to victims, and in this case the creditors, if there were a conviction, would be the victims. And that means that the judge would be providing restitution for the creditors anyway.

So what we say is that Mr. Harden is not getting anything for trading these valuable constitutional rights. It is true that he's getting what the prosecutor has to offer, but the prosecutor doesn't have anything to offer of great significance. It is not a robust offer. It is a little dainty tea cake of an offer. And a little dainty tea cake of an offer should not be enough to cause the trustee to waive the substantial rights of the people involved in this case.

Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else? Mr. Cheshire, Mr. Smith? Okay. Mr. Harden?

MR. HARDEN: I was not aware that the corporate bylaws had an indemnification provision. I do know that Mr. Van Etten's contract as executor has obviously been rejected by the trustee simply because it wasn't assumed within the 60 days required, and I would also remind the Court that Mr. Van Etten waived his claims against the estate when we settled the SEC litigation in that global settlement.

Let me make it clear. I'm not proposing to waive anybody's personal attorney/client privileges, and I'm not proposing to waive Mr. Wood's attorney work product privilege, because I don't think I can. But as Mr. Smith pointed out, there are capable District Court Judges who could take all these documents in camera and look at them and

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tell the U.S. Attorney what will be admissible and what won't, and I don't think we're talking about a hotbed of prickly issues in that regard. I mean they're going to get plenty of scrutiny by the District Court. It won't be your job. All I want you to do is make it possible for me to waive the privilege and have that inspection take place in that court.

I mean I don't have a written, specific, detailed written letter from Mr. Wilkinson. I do have a letter from Mr. Wilkinson, which I understood was the extent to which he could memorialize our agreement. I probably should have brought that today, but I didn't. It's similar to what is contained in the motions. It's very simple. It does not embellish much, if at all, what I've noticed out to creditors, but I'm sure that if the Court enters an order approving this settlement, if you find other parameters necessary, you can put those in the order, and that that would suffice very satisfactorily.

I did know that there were documents in Mr. Wood's possession, but I understood that Mr. Wood was reserving those documents and had no intention whatsoever of turning those over to me, and if for no other reason, Your Honor, you know, we need to waive the privilege so I can see the documents. I want to see those documents. I don't know how I'm going to get them if Mr. Wood is telling me that

everything is privileged and that's why he took it to his office. You know, I need some authority to get into those documents, and this is as good a time and place as any. I believe it's my duty to the creditors to inspect all of that and see if there's anything there that needs to be brought up.

The deal is obviously the best that the U.S.

Attorney can offer. I believe, Your Honor, that the—and Mr.

Smith is exactly right. This has occurred to me a thousand times. If there were crimes, then the creditors in this case were the victims, and I think that it is their right to collect any restitution that might be payable. It's my understanding that the restitution is not—that fines, you know, fines, for example, would have to be paid, or that there may be rigid statutory requirements about how money is spent, but I understood from Mr. Wilkinson that there was discretion of the court, in the District Court, and that he would do his best to help us formulate a way, since we have this bankruptcy in place, formulate a way to get the money funneled in to the creditors, who would, if there are crimes, be the victims.

I don't want to participate in a criminal trial. I want to minimize the estate's involvement in this case. And that aspect of it shouldn't go unacknowledged. I don't want to get involved in a crime fraud exception argument over in

the District Court. If we take this whole thing over there and he tries to—and Mr. Wilkinson says to the District Court, "Well, you know, all this attorney advice was given in the context of a pyramid scheme and it's all a fraud and therefore none of this stuff is privileged anyway," I'm going to be drawn into that fight. But if I get drawn into that fight, there's no benefit for the creditors because there's no deal.

So, you know, I strongly believe that the best thing we can do is waive the privilege and let the District Court sift through the documents, decide what's privileged and what isn't, and that way we'll at least permit some benefit to the creditors if that's possible down the road.

THE COURT: Mr. Wood?

MR. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a few points. First, Your Honor, any rejection of the employment agreement, we would contend, by Mr. Harden as under bankruptcy law, would not, we would argue, limit Mr. Van Etten's rights to enforce that at this time.

Secondly, the settlement with Mr. Harden speaks for itself, and we would argue that that is not a waiver as to this claim at this time. That it may be a claim that may be asserted in the future by Mr. Van Etten under an indemnification provision.

And on that same point, Your Honor, Mr. Etten's not

the only party involved here. I represent Mr. Smith in this proceeding, and there are other parties who would have those same rights of indemnification. I'm not aware of all the employment agreements, but certainly the bylaws speak for themselves.

As to the documents that I have, to my knowledge Mr. Harden's never asked for them before today. This is the closest he's ever come to asking for them. Obviously there was some misunderstanding between us, and Mr. Harden looking at the documents is a far cry from waiving the privilege. They're two different worlds apart. Mr. Smith eloquently explained that to the Court.

And we would contend finally, Your Honor, that Mr. Harden is not necessarily minimizing the involvement of the estate in these proceedings by waiving this privilege. I believe that the agreement could be interpreted that the company can still be prosecuted, and that could involve a large amount of work, or if, as it has in the Montana case and even in the SEC case, Mr. Harden's involvement was limited in the actual proceedings themselves.

So, as a result, we would again argue or urge this Court to deny the request of the trustee, and if the Court is inclined at all, we would urge this Court, very much so, to place strict limitations as far as what the Court's ruling on related to work product privilege and individual privileges

of a lot of different people, including my individual clients 1 in this proceeding, Mr. Van Etten and Mr. Smith. 2 3 Thank you, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Smith? MR. SMITH: Nothing further. Thank you, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Well, the Court certainly 6 recognizes the importance of the attorney/client privilege, 7 but we also have some very strong authority in the Weintraub 8 case that a Chapter 7 trustee for a corporation can waive the 9 privilege. Before I rule on this matter though, I have not 10 had a chance to read the brief that you've handed up today, 11 and I want to read that. I'll try not to take very long with 12 it, and I'll let you know my decision. If I do decide to 13 14 allow Mr. Harden's request, I will make it clear exactly what 15 it is he can and cannot get. Anyway, thank you. That will conclude our hearing, 16 and I'll take this matter under advisement. 17 18 (HEARING CONCLUDED) 19 20 21 22

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In Re: International Heritage, Inc.

International Heritage, Incorporated

99-02675-5**-**ATS 99-02674-5-ATS

CERTIFICATE

I, Jane W. Clapp, having been tested and approved by the Administrative Office of the Court in Washington, D.C., to provide transcription of legal proceedings from electronic sound recordings, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript, to the best of my ability, of the above entitled matter.

> ane W Clapp 7-26-00 Jane W. Clapp

Date